

**Written Testimony of Commander Scott Gerlicher  
Minneapolis Police Department  
August 2020**

**Introduction:**

As a 32-year veteran of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), I currently serve as a Commander and oversee the MPD's Special Operations and Intelligence Division. I have served in command level positions within the MPD since 2003, and have planned, executed, and been involved as incident commander for protests, demonstrations and special events since 1997. Major events I have commanded and/or been involved at a command level include the 2008 Republican National Convention, 2014 MLB All Star Game and 35W bridge collapse. In 2018 I also served as the lead planner and overall incident Commander for Super Bowl LII in Minneapolis. From 2003 to 2006, I also served as the Commander for the MPD's Third Precinct.

**My role during the riots of May/June:**

I was involved in a command level from the beginning of the civil disturbances which began on Tuesday, May 26<sup>th</sup> when we activated our MPD Command Post at the City's Emergency Operations Center at approximately 1400 hours. I then served as one of two MPD command representatives at the Multi Agency Command Center (MACC) led by the MN Department of Public Safety through its demobilization, June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020. My role in addition to making command level decisions was to formulate response plans for the MPD to respond to the civil unrest facing our city and to coordinate with our public safety partners at the local, state and federal level on this response, including coordinating with the MN National Guard, MN Department of Public Safety and Minnesota State Patrol in developing response plans in coordination with these and other law enforcement agencies.

**Overview Statement:**

During the period of civil unrest and riots, the City of Minneapolis and the MPD faced unprecedented levels of violence, assaultive behavior, arson, looting, and unlawful activity. These incidents were not confined to one specific area or precinct of the city but were widespread throughout the City of Minneapolis involving thousands of people at multiple locations simultaneously. While some protests were peaceful, others became very violent quickly; the level of aggression towards police officers was unlike anything I have ever witnessed. The civil unrest and rioting we faced was immediate and unrelenting, taking place all over the city along with neighboring cities. There was only a matter of hours between the initial incident which took place (the tragic death of George Floyd), and when the rioting and violence began, leaving us no time to plan. There is no playbook for what was experienced, not in Minneapolis, and not in any city in America, as was evidenced by rioting taking place all over our country. Our Department was very quickly overwhelmed.

**Chronology of major events occurring May 25<sup>th</sup> through June 7<sup>th</sup> along with a specific timeline attached (Appendix A).**

**Chronology:**

Very early, MPD knew that the death of Mr. Floyd was a significant traumatic event for our entire community and that protests would undoubtedly occur. We did not however realize at the time, the magnitude and extent of the protests we would face, nor did we know the extent

of the destruction and rioting which would take place over the next two weeks. The MPD activated our Command Post at approximately 1400 hours on Tuesday May 26<sup>th</sup>, 2020. In the command post we were able to leverage technology including several hundred of our public safety cameras to obtain situational awareness of what was happening in all parts of the city. Crowds had already gathered at both the death site at 38<sup>th</sup>/Chicago, as well as in front of the MPD's Third Precinct located at 3000 Minnehaha Ave S.

Present in the MPD command post throughout the protests/riots were key members of the MPD command staff including senior leadership (Commanders, Inspectors, Deputy Chiefs, the Assistant Chief and Chief Arradondo) along with representatives from the Minneapolis Fire Department, MN State Patrol, and Metro Transit Police. This was a 24-hour operation from that point forward. From the point when we first activated our MPD command post through the demobilization of the MACC 14 days later on June 7<sup>th</sup>, MPD had a full time Operations, Logistics, Planning/Staffing, Admin, and Intel sections consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Each section was staffed by MPD personnel. One of the challenges faced was related to resources within the MPD and how and where to re-deploy personnel from their traditional jobs into new roles associated with the riots/civil disturbances taking place. All of this while assuring we maintained the ability to answer 911 calls in the precincts and continue high priority investigative functions such as homicide, sex crimes, etc. Other than minimally staffing these core functions, all other MPD sworn personnel were dedicated throughout this period to duties associated with the civil disturbances and riots.

By 1800 hours on Tuesday evening May 26<sup>th</sup>, we first started to see violence begin to erupt outside the third precinct where some protestors began to throw rocks, bottles, and other projectiles at police officers present and at the third precinct building itself. We also started to see that officers in squad cars responding to 911 calls in other areas near the precinct were being surrounded by angry protestors where chemical aerosols had to be used to rescue these officers.

The level of violence grew very rapidly outside the third precinct and by 1930 hours Tuesday evening, protestors began to significantly damage the third precinct building, tearing down fences, breaking windows of vehicles in the parking lot, spray painting and vandalizing squad cars, the building itself and breaking through the glass front door of the precinct. It was at this point when the Chief authorized SWAT to deploy chemical munitions (otherwise known as tear gas) at the crowd in/around the precinct parking lot and building. While these munitions were initially effective, the size of the crowd continued to grow and continued to assault the precinct. The crowd had grown into the thousands. Also, at this time, violence and looting began at surrounding businesses including Minnehaha Liquor Store and the AutoZone nearby. An MPD Strike Team was able to respond and eventually secure these locations however only for the night, as the following day continued looting and fires along with massive crowds of protestors in the area made a safe response impossible.

The violence, looting and fires continued through that night and through subsequent days and nights, getting larger and affecting all areas of the city. MPD officers responded as best we could to priority one calls during this time, but often had to respond in groups rather than one or two squads so that the officers would not get surrounded and accosted by angry mobs of protestors. Priority one calls (the most serious calls for service) began to sit in pending for extended periods of time as no officers were immediately available to respond.

By late Tuesday night and early Wednesday morning May 27<sup>th</sup>, we were able to obtain some assistance from the MN State Patrol who helped us try and block some intersections and assist with the protests in the area of the third precinct.

By Wednesday evening May 27<sup>th</sup>, we received additional assistance from the MN State Patrol along with St. Paul Police and Wednesday night through Thursday morning, we had approximately 100 Troopers in/around the third precinct along with MPD officers trying to hold back protestors and keep the building secure. Both Tuesday night and Wednesday night, significant damage was done to the exterior of the precinct. Doors and windows which had been boarded up very early Wednesday morning by city crews were again damaged and breached Wednesday night.

Also, by Wednesday evening, we saw a significant increase in looting and arson fires, both in the area of the precinct, but also spreading to other areas of the city, basically widespread throughout every major business corridor in the city of Minneapolis.

Wednesday evening May 27<sup>th</sup> at approximately 1825 hours, protestors began looting the Target Store at Lake and Minnehaha, followed closely by Cub Foods, Schooner Tavern, Auto Zone, T Mobile, Footlocker, Boost Mobile and virtually every business in the vicinity of the third precinct. This was followed by arson fires which were also set at many of these locations.

The MPD was acting in a defensive posture at this time with literally no ability to safely respond and stop the looting and fires. Our resources were completely exhausted citywide and any attempt to intervene on the looting or assist the fire department with putting out fires, would have put the lives of officers, firefighters, and protestors at significant risk. Our primary mission at this time was the preservation of life.

#### **Requesting the MN National Guard:**

By early Wednesday evening May 27<sup>th</sup>, Chief Arradondo recognized that the situation in the city was dire and beyond the capabilities of our Department and other law enforcement agencies who had been assisting us. The chief indicated that he contacted the Mayor about requesting the MN National Guard Wednesday evening. It is my understanding that also on Wednesday evening, the request for the National Guard was made from the Mayor of Minneapolis to MN Governor Walz.

At 1945 hours Wednesday evening, I was asked by MPD Deputy Chief Henry Halvorson to complete a document with a written request for National Guard resources for the Chief of Police. Having drafted a previous request for the National Guard prior to Super Bowl LII, I was very familiar with what an initial request for the Guard should include. Typically, an initial request for the National Guard includes basic information in order for the Governor to make a decision. Once approved, this is then typically followed with more extensive and detailed information in close communication with the MN DPS and National Guard command staff.

At 2013 hours that evening I sent a document titled "*MN National Guard Request*" (Appendix B) to Deputy Chief Halvorson and Chief Arradondo. The written request was detailed and specific and included a mission plan, command and control, and specific number of National Guard soldiers requested (600 at that time). It also stated that, "*The MPD has expended all available resources within our Department as well as all available law enforcement assistance from our neighboring jurisdictions.*"

At 2111 hours, Chief Arradondo forwarded this same document with the request for National Guard Assistance via email to DPS Commissioner Harrington (Appendix B).

From that point forward and continuing into Thursday May 28<sup>th</sup> and Friday May 29<sup>th</sup>, I forwarded additional specific and more detailed written requests for assistance of both additional MN State Patrol Troopers and MN National Guard soldiers to the Commissioner of Public safety per his request. This also included a conference call on Thursday May 28<sup>th</sup> at 1400 hours with the Commissioner and MPD Command staff including myself, Chief Arradondo, and others outlining our specific needs from the State for both National Guard and State Troopers.

My additional written requests, sent via email (5/28 and 5/29) on behalf of the Chief of Police, included specific mission areas such as looting prevention details along business corridors, fire security details, critical infrastructure protection, area denial details, and precinct security teams. These requests included a much higher degree of specificity than the original request intended for the Governor and included written narratives of what each mission entailed, specific business corridors and lists of specific critical infrastructure sites to be protected, and MPD points of contact with phone numbers. The numbers of National Guard requested by MPD increased from the original request of 600 on Wednesday evening to almost 2000 National Guard requested by Friday May 29<sup>th</sup>. My request to the Commissioner also stated, *"This will require significant additional law enforcement and National Guard resources beyond what is currently in place and assumes full utilization of all available MPD resources"*.

It should be noted that although we were monitoring intelligence that significant numbers of people from out of town may arrive to join in the protests on Saturday May 30<sup>th</sup> as was testified to by Commissioner Harrington, our immediate concern was what was happening presently, as we did not have the resources to stop the violence and destruction currently taking place in Minneapolis. The situation was dire, and we needed assistance immediately.

Looting was widespread by Thursday May 28<sup>th</sup> mid-day as were violent protests in/around the third precinct. Chemical munitions were authorized and used to push crowds back however, groups of protestors came in waves and as soon as one group was dispersed by using CS gas, another group would fill in their place. This continued throughout the afternoon and into the evening on Thursday.

Also, of note was activity taking place in the parking lot across from the precinct adjacent to Target, Cub Foods and other businesses. This was the site of mass gatherings of protestors and at 1716 hours, there was a stabbing which occurred in this parking lot where one individual had been stabbed by another party. At this time, an MPD Strike Team of approximately 20 officers heroically went into this hostile crowd of thousands and rescued the victim, transporting him out of the area via squad car in order to get him medical attention. This strike team had to physically fight their way in and out of the area and CS munitions were also used to try and disperse this very large and violent group. Thankfully no officers or other people were injured during this rescue.

Since the time of the initial request for the National Guard Wednesday evening May 27<sup>th</sup>, we were able to secure approximately 100 National Guard members who arrived late on Thursday night May 28<sup>th</sup>. These soldiers were assigned and attached to MFD as a fire security detail to assist as a security force in response to fires. One complication with this plan however is that the Guard is unable to act independently without close support of law enforcement which meant that we had to also find and assign police officers to accompany the Guard and the Fire

Department to this detail as well. Thankfully, officers from the St. Paul Police Department (SPPD) were able to fulfill this function for which we are very appreciative. This is consistent with all details for the National Guard throughout the 14 day operational period which all required additional law enforcement in close support of their missions.

The number of National Guard deployed continued to grow, until the Governor ultimately did a full call-out of all MN National Guard statewide to assist with the situation in Minneapolis.

#### **Transition to the MACC:**

Late on Thursday May 28<sup>th</sup>, As the situation continued to worsen in Minneapolis, a decision was made to open up a Multi-Agency Command Center (MACC) which would become a metro-wide unified command center for all public safety resources and National Guard. Prior to this, MPD had been operating solely from our own command post located at our emergency operations center. Even with the opening of the MACC which occurred on Friday, May 29<sup>th</sup> at 1200 hours, MPD continued to operate our own command center in parallel to MACC operations as we had been since the beginning of the riots. Deputy Chief Kathy Waite and I were assigned as the two designated MPD Command representatives to the MACC which was headed by the MN Department of Public Safety and specifically, Assistant Commissioner Booker Hodges. The MACC also had representatives from all participating agencies along with a robust intelligence section coordinated through the MN BCA. In addition, National Guard command staff were present and during the entire operational period of the MACC, I worked in very close contact with the National Guard commanders on planning missions, details and overall coordination between MPD and the MN National Guard.

My understanding of the unified command structure in the MACC setting in this case was that MN DPS assumed overall command for metro wide resources and response while each city/jurisdiction was responsible for command and control of specific incidents taking place in their own city, backed up by partners who assisted with resources.

We are very familiar in operating in a MACC environment as this is the same model/structure we have used for major multi-jurisdictional operations including Super Bowl LII and the Republican National Convention.

Once at the MACC, we learned that in addition to significant call out of the National Guard which was in progress, MN DPS had made a statewide call out for all available law enforcement to respond to the city to assist. This call out was coordinated by the MN Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) who also dedicated personnel to coordinate responses from agencies and let them know where to report and then coordinate with MPD or SPPD or the MN State Patrol on specific duties. Several agencies both locally, and statewide sent police resources to assist.

At this same time, MPD had secured the Minneapolis Convention Center (MCC) as the staging area for National Guard and all mutual aid law enforcement agencies responding to assist. MPD and MSP appointed staging area managers who would then work with the MACC and MN National Guard on specifics of deployment. This all took significant time to organize due to the large number of resources, especially National Guard who were arriving at staging.

During this time, MPD was also taking steps to better fortify all of our police precincts, placing cement barriers, perimeter fencing and concertina wire around each to protect the buildings

and the officers inside. By Friday, we had lost the third precinct, however we wanted to take whatever steps were necessary to assure we did not lose another precinct.

On Friday evening May 29<sup>th</sup> as the MACC was fully operational, we continued to see significant violence, looting and fires widespread throughout Minneapolis. At this time, we had MN State Patrol fully engaged, along with significant assistance from the MN DNR, and several other metro law enforcement agencies. Even with this assistance, Friday night we were still working in a defensive posture with limited ability to intervene due to significant protests, looting and riots taking place citywide which spread our resources thin.

On Friday evening, the fifth Precinct located at 3101 Nicollet Ave S became a focal point of protests and violence. Rioters began trying to breach perimeter fencing, began throwing Molotov cocktails and launching fireworks at the building and officers inside the fence. As the evening progressed MPD Strike Teams along with MN State Patrol Mobile Field Force were able to respond and jointly dispersed the rioters using authorized CS munitions and less lethal projectiles. Although the group dispersed from the immediate area of the fifth precinct, they remained, and crowd size at this time was several thousand people. As darkness fell, rioters started fires at the post office, Wells Fargo bank, Office Max and looting was widespread at every business in the area which was one block from the precinct. Even with significant support from MN National Guard and law enforcement, it remained extremely difficult for MFD to respond and extinguish the large number of fires occurring in this area. Friday was the first night of the curfew which was put into place by Governor Walz. While we faced significant challenges throughout Friday night, the curfew did seem to help as many protestors did leave the area. Others were arrested for violating the curfew order as our resources permitted.

Moving into Saturday, May 30<sup>th</sup>, we continued to see widespread protests, looting, fires and property damage. Having said this, Saturday evening seemed to be the first night that we were really able to move from a defensive posture to an offensive posture and significantly impact on the looting and violence. This was I believe largely in part because all participating agencies were able to get more organized and into a "*battle rhythm*" so to speak. Strike teams were able to move efficiently and in closer coordination and the 8pm curfew was also very effective as it allowed us to intervene on any group, vehicle or person who was out after curfew. This disrupted small pockets of violent protestors who were scattered throughout the city. State troopers, soldiers and police officers in the field and also at the command level in the MACC seemed to be working very well together and making an impact.

Through the weekend and into the following week, we continued to face significant protests, many non-violent, along with scattered smaller groups of violent protestors. In addition to very large protests at multiple locations in the third precinct, we also saw very large protests and violence downtown, directed at the first precinct, along with other simultaneous protests in the fifth second precincts near the University of MN.

On Sunday May 31<sup>st</sup> at approximately 1700 hours, we had a very large group of protestors who had amassed on the 35W bridge over the Mississippi River. The crowd size was estimated at 10,000 plus. As this was being shown on live TV, at 1746 hours, a semi tanker truck drove onto the bridge and directly into the massive crowd which had gathered. We did not know at the time, whether this was an intentional act against the protestors or an unwitting act. The truck stopped in the middle of the group and it appeared that thankfully and miraculously no one was struck by the semi-truck. As the truck stopped however, numerous people angrily pulled the driver out of the truck. As we monitored this taking place in the MACC, we requested all

available resources to respond to the bridge. An MPD strike team was the first to respond and enter the massive crowd where with the assistance of some good Samaritans in the crowd, we were able to rescue the driver from the scene. It was later learned that the driver unwittingly drove onto the closed freeway and was not intending to drive into the crowd of protestors.

Throughout the first part of the week, large protests continued, and police resources remained stretched beyond our ability to quickly respond to emergency calls for service, as noted in the timeline, (see appendix A). Early in the week we continued to see many pending priority one calls. As the week progressed however, MPD was able to better and more quickly respond to 911 calls for service citywide.

On Thursday June 4<sup>th</sup>, there was a memorial service for George Floyd hosted by North Central University in Elliot Park. MPD coordinated police security at this event at the request of the family. The event was peaceful and there were no issues associated with it.

By Sunday June 7<sup>th</sup>, although several protests continued, we did not see further violence, rioting or anything of that nature. By Sunday evening, both the MACC and the MPD Command post were demobilized and MPD returned to normal operations. It should be noted that due to the destruction of the third precinct, officers from that precinct were temporarily relocated to work out of the Mpls Convention Center.

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During the Senate Committee hearing, you heard from various stakeholders including members of the Minneapolis Police Federation. During their testimony, heartfelt and emotional accounts were given of the situation along with some perceptions, beliefs and opinions on the part of the union representatives testifying. Below are some factual responses to the testimony received:

***Regarding the notion that there was a pre-plan in place to surrender the third precinct and that MPD never had a plan to defend the precinct:***

There was **never** a pre-plan by MPD to surrender the third precinct to protestors. In fact, to the contrary, we had a plan to defend the precinct indefinitely. By Thursday evening May 28<sup>th</sup>, officers who were assigned to the precinct, had endured unprecedented levels of violence towards them and had understandably become "*battle weary*". Our plan was to remove these third precinct officers from the precinct itself (40 or more) and replace them with a smaller highly trained SWAT strike team of approximately 12 officers. The plan was for this smaller SWAT team to remain out of site and inside the precinct and defend the precinct against protestors who may attempt to gain entry to the building. This would be accomplished by using both chemical munitions and less lethal projectiles. We had sufficient quantities of both on hand to defend the building for an extended period of time. In addition, we had plans to use exterior MPD strike teams from outside the precinct perimeter to respond as needed and use chemical munitions and less lethal projectiles to defend the building and disperse violent crowds as necessary. This plan would have protected and defended the precinct from both the outside and from the inside while having a non-visible footprint of officers outside the front door and on the roof of the building.

As outlined above, the plan to use a smaller SWAT compliment of officers was to reduce the visibility of officers outside the building and on the roof of the building. It became very evident, that a highly visible presence of officers outside the building and on the roof of the precinct

was a draw for the protestors who continually threw objects at along with launching fireworks at them. We felt that having a lower visibility and limited footprint outside the building coupled with a rapid ability to defend the building from the outside the perimeter would be a better and safer plan to defend the building.

Members of the Police Federation testified to the committee that they were certain there was a pre-plan to surrender the precinct. This was not the case, however the day before and the day of the precinct being ultimately surrendered, we did take some precautionary measures based upon heavy damaged sustained to the building in the two days prior. Both police squads and officers' personal vehicles had been damaged in the parking lot on the day prior. Most of the windows of the precinct had been broken out and the exterior of the building itself had suffered significant damage. We elected to remove high value items from the precinct including weapons, computers, memorabilia and officers' personal belongings. This was not done with an intent to surrender the building, but to preserve this property from further damage. We also removed all vehicles from the precinct parking a lot along with a mobile camera we had placed there. Again, this was done to avoid further damage to the building, police vehicles and officer's personal property and vehicles. It should be noted that these same precautionary measures were taken at the MPD's fifth precinct during this time.

Also, of note was that the precinct was not even operational as a precinct as of Wednesday because of the size of the crowds which had gathered and the violence we had been experiencing at that location. Third precinct officers were instructed to park off site at another location where they were either assigned to a squad to answer 911 calls in the precinct or bussed in a large group into the precinct itself as a security force to protect the precinct building. This was an incredibly stressful time for officers assigned to the third precinct who had been under siege since Tuesday.

On Thursday evening May 28<sup>th</sup> we did in fact order the evacuation of the officers at the third precinct, not initially however to surrender the building, but to replace these officers with the smaller SWAT strike team in order to defend it consistent with our plan as outlined above. It was only at approximately 2200 hours, that we received word from the Chief, that we were not to use any additional chemical munitions or less lethal projectiles to protect the building. This then forced us to change our initial plan and completely evacuate the building and leave the area, surrendering the precinct at 2215 hours. It is well documented that this directive came from the Mayor through the Chief of Police.

***Regarding testimony that Governor Walz "called the MPD Command Post" Thursday evening directing us to surrender the third precinct:***

This was a statement alleged by one of the police union members who testified. The individual who testified said she was in the command post and overheard the Governor on the phone to an unnamed individual saying to them, "Give it up" referring to the precinct. While the individual making this allegation was in fact in the command post at the time, her role was to assist in operating the technology in the room for the command staff present. In the time leading up to the precinct being surrendered, the highest ranking person in the MPD Command Post was the Assistant Chief who recalls no such call. In addition, Deputy Chiefs, and myself were all present in the command post. The Chief nor the Mayor were present in the command post. It is simply not plausible that Governor Walz would make a direct phone call to the MPD Command Post and speak with someone of a lower rank than Chief or the Mayor and issue a directive to give up the precinct. Further, I don't believe the Governor would have access to



the phone numbers needed to make this call. In addition, no member of the MPD Command staff I have spoken to that was present has any knowledge of the Governor calling the MPD command post at any time whatsoever. Therefore, this is allegation is simply not plausible.

***Regarding statements made about letting fires burn and looting to continue without intervention by police or fire:***

During the days and nights of the riots, arson was widespread and occurred not only in the vicinity of the third precinct, but many other areas of the city. These large fires of businesses were also the sites of large violent protests, both in and around the third precinct, and then also around the fifth precinct. At the time of these fires, there were hundreds and sometimes thousands of protestors in the area. This made a traditional response to the fires impossible as fire crews could not safely get to them to put them out. MPD resources were completely overwhelmed and we did not have sufficient numbers of officers and squad cars to accompany fire crews into these hostile scenes as officers would have to take and hold an area for several hours in order to have MFD respond and extinguish the fires. This would have necessitated significant levels of force and likely hand to hand protracted combat with violent protestors. Our mission at this time, was preservation of life. We did not want to risk the life of a police officer, fire fighter, or member of the public so that we could save an unoccupied business from a fire.

In addition to the above, agencies who we would normally look to for mutual aid assistance were also busy handling protests and violence in their own cities and jurisdictions. It really wasn't until later in the week when we established the MACC that were able to get resources needed to safely respond to fires and even so, this continued to be a significant challenge. Initially we were able to get a compliment of St. Paul Police Officers to respond and assist with a fire security force. In the following days, we also were able to receive assistance from the MN National Guard to also work as a fire security team however one important note is that the National Guard requires close support of law enforcement on their missions so we cannot simply turn over details such as fire security to the National Guard, we also have to dedicate significant law enforcement support, (which we did not have) to support the Guard on their missions.

No one was more heartbroken and frustrated than MPD and MFD were to see these businesses burn without any safe way to respond to them.

***Regarding testimony that MPD Command staff directed officers equipped with protective "turtle gear" not to don this equipment because "it looked too intimidating":***

During the hearing, there was testimony from the police union that some officers at the third precinct who were equipped with hardened riot gear known as "turtle gear" were told they could not don it as "it looked too intimidating". While I cannot speak for any supervisors who may have been at the precinct itself, I never heard this directive from anyone at the command post. As was stated, during these riots, our officers were constantly being barraged by rocks, bottles, fireworks, and other materials. I would have appreciated any level of protection they may have had available in order to protect them. While all of our officers are equipped with riot helmets, very few are equipped with the hardened turtle gear and in fact, we really have not had a significant need for that level of protection since the Republican National Convention. Based however on what we experienced in these riots, we are taking steps to equip all of our officers with higher levels of protective equipment in the coming months.

**Conclusion:** This was an unprecedented event for our city and our state. We have the utmost respect and special thanks to the MN State Patrol, The MN National Guard, MN Department of Natural Resources, MN Department of Public Safety, St. Paul Police Department, Hennepin County Sheriff's Office along with all other partners at the local, state and federal level. This was an event for which we had no time to prepare and one for which we will never forget.

*Commander Scott Gerlicher- Minneapolis Police Department*

### Appendix A: Timeline of Events

#### Monday May 25<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 1

- 1.1 Manger/Owner of Cup Foods (3759 Chicago Ave) calls 911 at 2000 hours, to report a Forgery in Progress. Suspect identified as George Floyd, who at 2125 hours, is declared deceased at HCMC.
- 1.2 Darnella Fraizer records police interaction with George Floyd and posts on Social Media; sparks concern over death.

## Tuesday May 26<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 2

- 2.1 0040 hours - Minneapolis Police Department releases statement, calling Floyd's death a "medical incident"
- 2.2 0310 hours - MPD announces the FBI will be a part of the investigation.
- 2.3 0600 hours - News Media and Social Media begin showing video from Darnell Frazier sparking outrage amongst Politicians and the public.
- 2.4 1030 hours - Crowd gathers at 38<sup>th</sup>/Chicago and a memorial starts to grow outside of Cup Foods.
- 2.5 1400 hours - Chief Arradondo terminates all four Officers from the original call.

### MPD Command Post at EOTF Opens

- 2.6 1630 hours - Hundreds of protestors gather at 38<sup>th</sup>/Chicago
- 2.7 1700 hours - Protest marches from 38<sup>th</sup>/Chicago towards the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct (Lake/Minnehaha).
- 2.8 1800 hours - Protestors arrive at 3<sup>rd</sup> Police Precinct - Crowd size approximately 8,000
- 2.9 1805 hours - Protestors throw rocks, bottles and other projectiles at Police and Squad Cars; police respond with pepper spray towards the crowd.
- 2.10 1813 hours - Radio Cross Patched with State Patrol; State Patrol shuts down vehicle traffic on Hiawatha.
- 2.11 1824 hours - Squad surrounded/trapped at 34<sup>th</sup>/Chicago Ave
- 2.12 1829 hours - Squad surrounded/trapped at 35<sup>th</sup>/Hiawatha Ave
  - a. Mace authorized to rescue Officers
- 2.13 1833 hours - Squad with two Officers still trapped
  - a. Protestors throwing objects at squad
  - b. Officers sent in on foot to rescue Squad w/ Officers
  - c. 1837 hours all Officers out
- 2.14 1842 hours - Protestors throw bricks and other projectiles at squad cars, causing windows to be shattered.

- 2.15 1847 hours - Protestors break through front door of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Police Precinct and surround the precinct.
- 2.16 1930 hours - Protestors observed damaging property at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Police Precinct to include:
  - a. Windows broken out of squad cars
  - b. Fences being torn down; secured parking area for personal vehicles compromised
  - c. Personal vehicles damaged (windows/windshields broken; vehicles dented)
  - d. Windows broken at the precinct
  - e. Property spray painted
  - f. Squad cars vandalized (spray painted, and windows broken)
- 2.17 1944 hours - CS Munitions deployed by SWAT to clear the parking lot of the precinct.
  - 2 Pending Priority One Calls**
- 2.18 2002 hours - Response cars requested to 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct; Injuries to Officers reported
- 2.19 2204 hours - AutoZone glass broken
- 2.20 2313 hours - 12 squads left to move from 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 2.21 2323 hours - Minnehaha Liquor Store (26<sup>th</sup>/Lake St) broken into; looting begins

### Wednesday May 27<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 3

- 3.1 0043 hours - Protestors observed throwing rocks at flood lights at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 3.2 0049 hours - State Troopers arrive
- 3.3 0132 hours - Arrests made for looting at the liquor store
- 3.4 0253 hours - Maxit Pawn (27<sup>th</sup>/Lake St):
  - a. Broken into
  - b. Looting begins
  - c. No resources to respond
- 3.5 0342 hours - Protestor/Rioter shoots high powered bb gun at Officers in front of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 3.6 0400 hours - Front door of 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct shot out
- 3.7 0500 hours - Crowd dissipates to manageable levels; nothing of significance occurring
- 3.8 1351 hours - 25 - 30 protestors breaking fence around 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct

- 3.9 1414 hours - Officers taking projectiles from protestors
- 3.10 1423 hours - State Patrol attempting to shut down Lake St. exits from Hiawatha
- 3.11 1433 hours - Brick thrown through the window of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 3.12 1733 hours - Barricades thrown at front door of 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 3.13 1737 hours - Crowd hostile and breaking all of the windows of 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 3.14 1812 hours - Gas deployed, and Mounted Unit arrives; barricades taken were recovered
- 3.15 1825 hours - Target store windows broken; crowd begins looting
- 3.16 1842 hours - Officers attempting to gather team to secure Target but still taking rocks and bottles from large group at Lake and Snelling; attempting to secure barricades and dumpster
- 3.17 1847 hours - Schooner Tavern broken into; looting begins
- 3.18 1859 hours - Jersey barriers requested
- 3.19 1914 hours - Autozone breached and looting begins; cart set on fire in parking lot
- 3.20 1917 hours - Fire set in Target parking lot
- 3.21 2005 hours - Cub foods in breached and looting begins
- 3.22 2022 hours - Crowd using items taken from the looting, golf balls, glass bottles of beer, and fireworks to throw at officers
- 3.23 2104 hours - Target is set on fire
- 3.24 2111 hours - Chief Arradondo sends written request for MN National Guard assistance to DPS Commissioner Harrington.**
- 3.25 2124 hours - Autozone is set on fire, fire will respond when area surrounding is under control
- 3.26 2129 hours - Building to the east Autozone is on fire
- 3.27 2131 hours - Tmobile, Urban29, Boost Mobile, and Footlocker being looted
- 3.28 2141 hours - Aldi is on fire

- 3.29 2149 hours - Crowd attempting to barricade the fire department in at 27th and Lake
- 3.30 2231 hours - Advance Auto Parts at 18th and Lake St being looted
- 3.31 2240 hours - Dollar Tree is on fire
- 3.32 2255 hours - Cub Food is on fire; O'Rileys Auto Parts being looted
- 3.33 2317 hours - Minneapolis Mobile camera set on fire
- 3.34 2317 hours - Frattalones Hardware at 39 Ave/ Lake St being looted
- 3.35 2320 hours - TCF Bank 31st and Lake St set on fire
- 3.36 2321 hours - Verizon store being looted
- 3.37 2321 hours - Another unidentified business near 34th / Lake St being looted
- 3.38 2324 hours - US Bank on fire
- 3.39 2326 hours - Scooters Ramps store 38th / Snelling Ave being looted
- 3.40 2326 hours - TCF Bank and Walgreen being looted

#### **6 Pending Priority One Calls**

- 3.41 2335 hours - T-Mobile near 35th and Emerson being looted
- 3.42 2336 hours - Crowd attempted to pull officer into the crowd at the precinct
- 3.43 2342 hours - Target Express at Fremont Av/ Lake St being looted
- 3.44 2345 hours - 2801 Lake St apartment building with occupants on roof is fully engulfed. Officers respond
- 3.45 2359 hours - MPD spread too thin SPPD to hold 29th and Lake St

#### **Thursday May 28<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 4**

#### **0000 hours: 10 Pending Priority One Calls**

- 4.1 0004 hours - State Patrol in route to assist at 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 4.2 0035 hours - Crowd breaching Arby's; looting begins
- 4.3 0044 hours - Multiple shots fired from crowd at Target parking lot
- 4.4 0048 hours - McDonalds breached; looting begins

- 4.5 0052 hours - Walgreens is on fire  
**0100 hours: 11 Pending Priority One Calls**
- 4.6 0127 hours - Wendy's is on fire
- 4.7 0156 hours - 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct power is running on generators  
**0200 hours: 14 Pending Priority One Calls**
- 4.8 0245 hours - Walgreens at 31<sup>st</sup> / Lake St being looted
- 4.9 0308 hours - Speedway at 44<sup>th</sup> / Lake St being looted
- 4.10 0309 hours - Napa being looted
- 4.11 0331 hours - Strike Teams deploying to business and confirmed Dominos was looted
- 4.12 0335 hours - Vehicle attempted to strike Officers with vehicle in Target parking lot
- 4.13 0523 hours - Objects being thrown at front door of 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 4.14 0620 hours - Dollar general is on fire
- 4.15 0930 hours - 2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct response cars/ BRRT Officers and jersey barriers requested
- 4.16 1650 hours - Fires are rekindling due to winds
- 4.17 1716 hours - Stabbing at Target, Strike Team 1 responding
- 4.18 1734 hours - Large protest at Hennepin County Government Center - downtown
- 4.19 1812 hours - Crowd attempts to break into the downtown Footlocker
- 4.20 1818 hours - Group that marched arrives at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 4.21 1858 hours - Hennepin Library at Minnehaha / Lake St breached and possibly on fire
- 4.22 1944 hours - Fire rig trying to reach patient is getting eggs thrown at them
- 4.23 1944 hours - Gate compromised at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct and barricade is breached
- 4.24 2049 hours - Crowd is throwing rocks and bottles at people in front of the 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct
- 4.25 2052 hours - Crowd is throwing rock and bottles at Officers in front of Gay 90s
  
- 4.26 2053 hours - Front door is breached at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 4.27 2053 hours - Officers taking rocks and bottles on Hennepin, downtown; near 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct

- 4.28 2101 hours - Officers taking paintball rounds, frozen water bottles, rocks, and mortar rounds in rear of 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 4.29 2107 hours - State Patrol arrives at the 1<sup>st</sup> Precinct
- 4.30 2112 hours - US Bank at 30 Ave / Lake St E and Cash and Pawn are on fire
- 4.31 2155 hours - Order given to Evacuate the 3rd precinct
- 4.32 2205 hours - Busses arrive several blocks away from third precinct, and officers are escorted and walk from the precinct while rocks and bottles thrown at them by rioters.
- 4.33 2210 hours - Officers taking rocks and bottles at 6th / Nicollet Ave
- 4.34 2211 hours - Precinct 3 is on fire
- 4.35 **2215 hours - PRECINCT 3 IS COMPROMISED**
- 4.36 2236 hours - Businesses near 7th / Nicollet Ave being looted
- 4.37 2249 hours - Reported looting at 10th St and Nicollet Ave
- 4.38 2305 hours - Reported windows being broken 7th/ Marquette Ave
- 4.39 2321 hours - Zipps Liquor 27th / Franklin being looted
- 8 Pending priority one calls**
- 4.40 2350 hours - Officers taking objects at downtown
- 4.41 2351 hours - Walgreen and Smoke Shop at 46th / Hiawatha Ave being looted
- 4.42 2359 hours - Reported looters at 7th St / Hennepin Ave

#### **Friday May 29<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 5**

**0000 hours: 13 Priority one calls pending**

- 5.1 0044 hours - Group breaking into business at 7th / Hennepin Ave
- 5.2 0106 hours - The American Swedish Institute on fire
- 5.3 0115 hours - Shopping Center at 29th and 21st Ave is on fire
- 5.4 0117 hours - Rocks thrown at 4th / Nicollet Ave
- 5.5 0140 hours - Somali pharmacy at Franklin Ave E and 24th Av being looted
- 5.6 0141 hours - Police Squad fully engulfed in flames across from 4th precinct



- 5.7 0227 hours - Mercado Central, 15th / Lake St being looted
- 5.8 0242 hours - National Guard deploys with Minneapolis Officers to 22nd/ Lake St E, responders take rocks from crowd.
- 0316 hours- MPD Assistant Chief and Deputy Chief are flagged down by a motorist who found a deceased woman in a car at 17<sup>th</sup>/Bryant Ave N. This woman was the victim of a homicide.
- 5.9 0318 hours - Marisol Mobile at 719 Lake St E being looted
- 5.10 0327 hours - Elevated Beer Wine and Spirits being looted
- 0400 hours: 11 Pending Priority one calls**
- 5.11 0422 hours - 110 E 31 St on fire
- 1200 hours MACC Opens at TCF Bank Stadium**
- 5.12 1558 hours - Protest at 4th St N / 1st Av N approx. 50 and appeared law abiding simultaneous protest at HCGC plaza; *1<sup>st</sup> Precinct*
- 1600 hours: 9 Pending Priority one calls**
- 5.13 1620 hours - Group met with another group and now the protest is marching, and the total is in the thousands; *1<sup>st</sup> Precinct*
- 5.14 1732 hours - Protest at 100 Church St SE, approximately 100 in front of UMPD; *2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.15 1750 hours - Crowd moving onto 35W, State Patrol not available to shut down traffic; *1<sup>st</sup> Precinct*
- 5.16 1842 hours - Group of protestors at the Federation. *2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.17 1852 hours - National Guard Military convoy got stuck in crowd and needs evacuation; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.18 1945 hours - Crowd has left the area; *2<sup>nd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.19 1946 hours - Taking incoming rocks at Lake St/ Minnehaha Ave; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.20 1950 hours - State Patrol completely surrounded; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.21 1954 hours - Crowd throwing rocks at State Patrol in front of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*

- 5.22 2000 hours - Curfew in place; major interstates closed off for traffic
- 5.23 2009 hours - PD assisting to evacuate NG and State Patrol; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.24 2012 hours - Military truck broke down, using large tow strap; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.25 2018 hours - Shots fired on Hiawatha Ave at Officers; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.26 2021 hours gas deployed to disperse the crowd; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.27 2026 hours - NG and all PD are clear from the area; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 5.28 2056 hours - Crowd of 2,000 at the precinct; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.29 2057 hours - National Guard and State Patrol not available; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.30 2106 hours - Crowd attempting to breach the gate around the 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.31 2108 hours - Male rioter attempting to break windows at gas station; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.32 2110 hours - Crowd back on 35W after marching throughout Downtown, State Patrol not available to assist; *1<sup>st</sup> Precinct*
- 5.33 2117 hours - Crowd throwing rocks and bricks at the precinct; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.34 2126 hours - Crowd attempting to breach Wells Fargo; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.35 2136 hours - Stop and shop breached and looting begins; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.36 2137 hours - Wells Fargo and Benadira pharmacy being looted; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.37 2143 hours - Gas station and tobacco shop are on fire; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.38 2145 hours - Office Depot being looted; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.39 2149 hours - Crowd ripping fence down at the 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct
- 5.40 2149 hours - Best Wash being looted; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.41 2208 hours - Post Office and Walgreens being looted; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.42 2228 hours - Crowd using rackets to launch rocks while others try to breach the perimeter fence; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.43 2250 hours - Crowd still at 2,000 and speedway now being looted; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 2300 hours: 12 Pending priority one calls**
- 5.44 2302 hours - ATM at Wells Fargo and Office Max on fire; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.45 2309 hours - Large objects and fireworks being thrown at the front of the 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct

- 5.46 2331 hours - State Patrol marches to back of precinct; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.47 2334 hours - Molotov being thrown at front of precinct, gas delivered; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.48 2338 hours - Multiple injured officers; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*
- 5.49 2341 hours - Shots fired at officers; *5<sup>th</sup> Precinct*

**Saturday May 30<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 6**

**0000 hours: 12 Pending priority one calls**

- 6.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 6.2 0001 hours thru 0500 hours - Dispersing riotous crowds
- 6.3 0032 hours - Crowd running onto highway jumping on vehicles, damaging windows
- 6.4 0137 hours - Mille Lacs County Sherriff sends 8 - 12 officers sent to staging
- 6.5 0140 hours - Bloomington PD sends 6 Officers to assist

**0200 hours: 18 Priority one calls pending**

**0400 hours: 26 Priority one calls pending**

**0600 hours: 33 Priority one calls pending**

**1400 hours: 18 Priority one calls pending**

- 6.6 1415 hours - 1000 gather at 5<sup>th</sup> Police Precinct (EVENTP 20-146501)
- 6.7 1523 hours - Approximately 3,000 people
- 6.8 1707 hours - Approximately 6,000 people
- 6.9 1738 hours - Fire reported at Post Office (31<sup>st</sup> St/1<sup>st</sup> Ave)
- 6.10 1845 hours - Approximately 7,000 people
- 6.11 1900 hours - Rocks and other projectiles thrown over fence at the 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct  
**1900 hours: 18 Priority one calls pending**
- 6.12 1930 hours - National Guard Deployed
- 6.13 1937 hours - Crowd throwing bottles and other objects at west gate of 5th precinct

- 6.14 2000 hours - Curfew in effect; freeways closed
- 6.15 2003 hours - A crowd begins to march
- 6.16 2048 hours - Officers taking heavy rocks and metal, crowd shooting projectiles from tubes
- 6.17 2116 hours - While teams are trying to clear area, group attempts to breach fencing around 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct
- 6.18 2121 hours - Group blocks NB and SB 35W
- 6.19 2135 hours - Crowd throwing rock and fireworks at State Patrol and PD
- 6.20 2145 hours - Officers will attempt to make arrests
- 6.21 2235 hours - Large crowd has formed at Lake St / Hiawatha Ave in 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct
- 6.22 2253 hours - Squad 1281 airs "shots fired at police" at 14<sup>th</sup>/Lake St.; *3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct*
- 6.23 2254 hours - Shots fired at officers, two in custody; gun recovered

**Sunday May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2020 - Day 7**

**0000 hours: 20 Pending Priority one calls**

- 7.1 0115 hours multiple people taken into custody and transported to 5<sup>th</sup> Precinct
- 7.2 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center

**0400 hours 27 Pending Priority one calls**

- 7.3 0420 hours - Homicide occurs - incident location: 1300 2<sup>nd</sup> St (20-147311)

**0600 hours: 29 Pending Priority one calls**

**1300 hours: 20 Pending Priority one calls**

- 7.4 1500 hours - Rally/March begins at US Bank Stadium; eventually moves to the I-35W Bridge - crowd size over 8,000
- 7.5 1517 hours - Protest at 6 St S/ Chicago Ave S, approximately 700-800 people
- 7.6 1527 hours - Approximately 1000 people

- 7.7 1539 hours - Approximately 3000 people, appears law abiding
- 7.8 1616 hours - Stalled in intersection near HCGC
- 7.9 1635 hours - SPPD reports that marchers are in WB lanes of 94 heading WB
- 7.10 1711 hours - Crowd enters 35W
- 7.11 1717 hours - Reported that traffic is still coming SB 35W
- 7.12 1746 hours - Tanker truck drives onto I-35W Bridge (EVENTP 20-147686)
- 7.13 1747 hours - Semi gets off of NB 35W and enters crowd
- 7.14 1748 hours - Driver is pulled from the Semi and is being assaulted and unknown if anyone in crowd is injured
- 7.15 1750 hours - Multiple reports from those on scene about semi and that the driver is being assaulted and still unknown if any of the crowd is injured
- 7.16 1753 hours - Officers arriving are taking heavy projectiles from the crowd
- 7.17 1800 hours - Mass arrest operation on I-35W Bridge and Washington Ave/I-35W
- 7.18 1823 hours - Officers attempting to convoy out injured, now trying to contain on the bridge
- 7.19 1849 hours - No known patients found  
1900 hours: 26 Pending priority one calls
- 7.20 2000 hours - Curfew in effect; freeways closed
- 7.21 2056 hours - Crowd begins to disperse
- 7.22 2030 hours - Curfew arrests begin - 276 arrests in total  
2300 hours: 24 Pending priority one calls

### Monday June 1<sup>st</sup>, 2020 - Day 8

- 8.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center  
0500 hours: 19 Pending priority one calls

- 8.2 0900 hours - Tactical Operations moved to MACC (Lt.Kingsbury, Lt. Nelson, Sgt. Schoonover)
- 8.3 1352 hours 1 Twins Ways, approximately 100 people  
1400 hours: 19 Pending priority one calls
- 8.4 1646 hours SPPD protest at Governor's Mansion  
1900 hours: 24 Pending Priority one calls
- 8.5 1700 hours group at US Bank Stadium
- 8.6 1722 hours No longer monitoring
- 8.7 2000 hours - Curfew in effect  
2300 hours: 25 Pending Priority one calls

#### Tuesday June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2020 - Day 9

0200 hours: 23 Pending priority one calls

- 9.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 9.2 No actionable events in Minneapolis  
1900 hours: 27 pending priority one calls
- 9.3 2000 hours - Curfew in effect  
2300 hours: 23 Pending Priority one calls

#### Wednesday June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2020 - Day 10

- 10.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 10.2 1600 hours - Nicollet/11th St "Fire Liz Collins" Protest/march originating at WCCO TV, and moving on to Star Tribune, and 1st Precinct. Several thousand in attendance. Smaller simultaneous protests at MPD Federation hall and 15th Av SE/4th St SE
- 10.3 2000 hours - Curfew in effect
- 10.4 2330 hours - Last of protest disperses, 3 arrested for curfew violations.

#### Thursday June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 11

- 11.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 11.2 1100 hours - North Central Bible College "George Floyd Memorial Service" Minimal PD presence needed
- 11.3 1745 hours - MPD Federation Hall - Small group protest uneventful
- 11.4 1745 hours - 15th Av SE/4th St SE - Small group protest/intersection blocking, uneventful
- 11.5 2000 hours - Curfew in effect

#### **Friday June 5<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 12**

- 12.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 12.2 150 State Troopers sent home
- 12.3 1522 hours - US Bank Stadium "Unfinished Business 10k March" Protest march originating at US Bank Stadium, marching into 3rd Precinct and back into downtown. 3000 plus in attendance.
- 12.4 2000 hours - Curfew in effect

#### **Saturday June 6<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 13**

- 13.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 13.2 1400 hours - 2000 2nd St NE Bottineau Park "Defund Police Protest" Rally/march originating in Bottineau Park, stopping at the MPD Federation hall, and ending at Hennepin/University. 1000 plus in attendance.
- 13.3 1800 hours - 5th Av SE/4th St SE Small protest blocking the street, 100 in attendance.
- 13.4 1800 hours - Hennepin/University March dispersing.

#### **Sunday June 7<sup>th</sup>, 2020 - Day 14**

- 14.1 3<sup>rd</sup> Precinct Personnel - Operates out of Convention Center
- 14.2 1440 hours - 3400 15th Av S Powderhorn Park "Defund Police Rally"
- 14.3 1911 hours - Powderhorn Park event closed
- 14.4 2000 hours - Command Post at EOTF officially closed/demobilized.

**Appendix B:**  
**Initial written request for MN National Guard**

Written by Cmdr Gerlicher Weds 5/27 @ 2013 hours

Sent by Chief Arradondo to Commissioner J. Harrington Weds 5/27 @ 2111 hours

The Minneapolis Police Department requests assistance of the MN National Guard for immediate assistance with significant civil unrest occurring in the City of Minneapolis. The MPD has expended all available resources within our Department as well as all available law enforcement assistance from our neighboring jurisdictions.

**Mission Plan:**

Area Security and Force Protection Operations

Area Denial Operations

Transportation assistance for law enforcement officers

Logistical assistance for the overall security operation

**Command and Control:**

The National Guard would fit into the MPD established incident command structure headed by the MPD. National Guard personnel would be supervised by on site MPD supervisors who would coordinate with National Guard command structure. The overall MPD commander for the detail to whom the National Guard would report to is MPD Deputy Chief Kathy Waite

**Number of Assets:**

The MPD requests 600 National Guard Soldiers along with compliment of command and control  
In addition, the MPD requests, vehicles to be used for transportation and support to all above listed missions