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## ROCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT INVESTIGATIVE ACTION REPORT

2023-00048579

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	lv: .: N	// First Middl	New April				II tion - of O	a							In .
	Victim's Name (Last, First, Middle) or Name of Business <b>Belton, Rhondesia</b>					900 E MAIN ST Rochester									Beat <b>225</b>
DETAIL	The state of the s						dent (Most Recent Classification)								
		Classification After Investigation (Include Law Section Number)													
	Non-Criminal Death Investigation												No		
	Suspect Type Suspect Name (Last, First, Middle) Nickname											<u> </u>			
PER	Address									IOD #					
ING	Address			Date of Birth Age Sex Race Ethnicity Mol						MoRIS /	JCR#				
SUSPECT / MISSING PER	Height We	ight Hair Color	Hair Length		Eye Color	Glasses	Complexion	Build		Fa	acial Hair		Gang Affilia	ation	
CT/	Clothing, Jewe	elry, Distinguishing		Offender Conditon Scars, Marks, Tattoos											
SPE															
S	Missing Perso	n Code	Missing Person	Mothers Mai	den Name Missing Person Place of Birth					School ID Number					
R	Year	Make		1100 71000 000 00 00 00	Model			Style						Color	
VEHICLE RECOVERY	State	e Registration # VIN #			<u>I</u>			Towed to -					l		
A.	Location Reco	Populared			Date Time			Towed by - Owner Notified by:							
CLE	LOCALION (NOCOTOTO)				Date Time Switch to										
VET.	Evidence of Damage / Method of Theft Time Radio Notified of Reco											Recovery			
NARRATIVE	Victim Victim Victim Victim Victim Victim Victim Victim Victim	(1): (dece (2): (dece	cted , Rocted , Rocted , cted , cted , cted acted	ndesia a Step dy Mil , R Redacted dacted , R Redacted , Redacted	Belton, hens (H	Redactions Roch Rochester ochester Rochester R	ted, Buf s), Redac chester ester ter r	falo	racus	see					
	Continuance o	f			Changed to					Icı	osed by				
Z	Not Applicable (non-crime)				Not App	Not Applicable (non-crime)				١	Not Applicable (non-crime)				
ATIC	Exceptional Clearance Bia				Bias Type	as Type				Vi	Victim Relationship to Suspect				
INVESTIGATION	Property Recovered Value of Property			# Arrested			SF	RR	M	Multiple Clearup Teletype Status					
Ž	Additional Techwork Performed										Further Investigation Conducted By				
Reporting Officer IBM # WEIGEL ERIC 1607							Date 03/23/20		wed By	ERI	C C. 03/2	23/202	3		

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There was a rap concert (GloRilla) on the evening of March 5, 2023 at the Armory Concert Hall (900 E. Main St) from 20:00 to 23:00 hours. RPD had a special event detail in place for outside the venue. consisting of one sergeant and seven officers or investigators. The Armory had security inside the venue, provided by Enterprise Security Consulting & Training (ESCT). The performer, GloRilla, also had her own security, provided by Feel Safe VIP.

At the conclusion of the event, around 23:05, officers on the special event detail observed a crowd running out of the front of the venue. It appeared to have been a massive flow of people pushing and shoving their way out in what was described as a stampede. Simultaneously, there were 911 calls and reports for a possible shooting, stabbing, and overdose inside the venue. Due to the mass exodus, officers were unable to immediately make their way inside. It appeared as though Security was unable to manage the size and volume of the crowd.

Eventually, as the crowd cleared out and officers were able to make their way inside, they located several individuals that had essentially been trampled inside during the mass exodus. EMS, RFD Members and RPD Officers assisted Security who were attempting to provide medical aid to the first four listed victims who were unresponsive inside the front entryway. (V4) Redacted was removed from the chaotic scene and transported to URMC by her friends. (V1), (V2) and (V3) were eventually transported to URMC by AMR. (V1) Belton was pronounced dead shortly after arrival on March 5. (V3) Miller was pronounced dead on March 6. (V2) Stephens (Haskins) was pronounced on March 8. The additional listed victims arrived by private vehicles at area hospitals with what were described as minor non-life-threatening injuries.

The owner of the venue (Scott Donaldson) was on-scene and cooperative with us. He advised the majority of the video surveillance inside the venue were simply dummy cameras that did not record. Officers did locate a surveillance system with at least two live view cameras. Technicians were unable to determine if they recorded at the time but Donaldson provided consent for us to take the system and follow up.

Donaldson advised the security company he utilized was ESCT (Enterprise Security Consulting and Training Company). We were provided with 40 names working security for this company the evening of the concert. Investigators and PSI Supervisors interviewed Security who remained on-scene.

Donaldson was only able to provide an estimated attendance of approximately 3000 people. The following day, Armory General Manager, Pam Fee, provided an estimated attendance of 3900 people. Donaldson and Fee also indicated the Armory had a security team consisting of 10-15 individuals and agreed to provide a list of names. When Investigators attempted to obtain a more accurate headcount, and the list of Armory Security, they were denied by the owner, acting on advice of his attorney. Licensing indicated the venue had a capacity of 5000.

During the preliminary investigation we were unable to substantiate any shots fired or stabbing having occurred inside. Some patrons interviewed reported hearing a couple loud pops, but it appears these noises were likely confetti poppers at the end of the concert. There were reports, along with the smell of pepper spray being utilized. There is conflicting information as to the front doors being closed and locked with chains during the concert. Unlocked chains were observed on the doors.

Goodman Section completed an ABC referral, CR 23-048650. We requested RFD have a Fire Marshall check for code compliance during the preliminary investigation. Members of RFD responded the

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night of and scheduled follow up.

Investigators Barber and Gotham, and Sergeants Reff and Weigel followed up on numerous tasks related to this investigation in the subsequent days after March 5.

Investigators initiated contact with family members of the three deceased victims. They facilitated locating and returning any lost property to them and addressing any concerns or follow up. Investigators also followed up with re-interviewing the additional eight victims.

All lost property which was initially collected by staff at the Armory was collected by Investigators, photographed and cataloged before being turned in to the Property Clerk's Office. This in addition to all footwear and cell phones collected the night of the incident by the Technician's Unit.

Members of PSI conducted interviews of Security personnel who were not interviewed at the Armory. Interviews were also conducted of dozens of concert-goers and tipsters in the subsequent days. Follow up interviews were also attempted with all of the 911 callers. Investigators met with or corresponded with attendees who lost property, attempting to reunite them with their respective keys, coats, jewelry, shoes, clothing items, phones, etc.

The primary security company contracted by the Armory was ESCT, they conducted pat frisks at the main entrance, and security throughout the venue. Additionally, GloRilla had private security provided by Feel Safe VIP, also a local company, who remained backstage and left immediately at the conclusion of the concert with the performer.

The Technician's Unit utilized DVR Examiner on the DVR system collected and learned there was no video of the incident, and it was determined to have no videos saved since 2014. The two ATM machines on the concert floor and one machine in the lobby were all learned to not have video recording capabilities. There were no external video sources on the Armory or any independent sources in the immediate neighborhood around the Armory. Several videos and posts on social media were reviewed and uploaded to C3. All BWC video taken during the incident was also reviewed.

On March 13, 2023 members of the RPD CAB, RFD, Buildings and Zoning (Code Enforcement), PSI and Donaldson's attorneys conducted a walk-through of the Armory. The Director of Buildings and Zoning completed an assessment and list of violations.

RPD Officers interviewed dozens of Armory Staff leaving the facility in the early hours of March 6, coupled with the numerous interviews conducted by PSI, over 100 people in total were interviewed. Many people had little or no information to provide to the investigation. Many people heard second hand, the report of shots fired or loud "pops," however, no person interviewed was able to provide a first-hand account of any of these claims. Several people interviewed opined on what transpired or why, but aside from speculation, no facts were learned. Furthermore, there was no physical evidence to support gunshots having been fired inside the venue. Although there were some claims of gunshots fired immediately in front of the Armory, RPD members outside their vehicles in front of the venue were able to refute this assertion.

Investigators re-interviewed several Security Guards from ESCT, many of which claimed to have no knowledge of what precipitated the rush of people toward the front door. There were a few Security Guards, stationed near or at the front door, who provided essentially the same version of events. They reported a large number of people, possibly 200, were outside on the front steps attempting to

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gain entry with less than 20 minutes remaining in the show. Some of these people were insistent upon being permitted to enter claiming they possessed VIP tickets. Security attempted to allow entry to these VIP ticket holders, while conducting pat-frisks and checking tickets. Some reported the tickets were not scanned. Eventually, all of the approximately 200 people were able to overtake Security and gain entry to the foyer. Security attempted to create a stronghold on the inner, wooden doors, to maintain this crowd in the entryway. As the concert concluded, thousands of people were attempting to exit via the front/main doors and were met with a crowd attempting to enter. This "traffic jam" is one of the likely contributing factors to the stampede as people still within the main concert hall began to push toward the front doors. Additional reports provided the crowd was exiting the front doors when an unknown issue, further inside the Armory, created a rush or surge of people pushing violently toward the exit.

On March 20, I was contacted by the Director of Investigations for the New York State Department of Health. He indicated he was issuing a subpoena to the Armory's Owner and the Promoter to establish an accurate head count of attendees. Additionally, these results would be shared with PSI when they become available.

At this point in the investigation, PSI has not located any physical evidence, video evidence, nor eye witness account of a criminal act which caused hundreds, if not thousands of people to engage in a mass exodus of the Armory. We have also not found any evidence the front doors were locked at the time the concert concluded, conversely any eye witness with knowledge or observations of the front doors stated they were all (four) open.

NARRATIVE

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